06__MAZUR.DOC

6/18/2007 3:02 PM

MILITARY VALUES IN LAW
DIANE H. MAZUR*

INTRODUCTION
One of the most celebrated leaders at the United States Military Academy
at West Point in 2006 was a civilian—and a woman. West Point hired Maggie
1
Dixon as the head coach of Army’s collegiate women’s basketball team just
eleven days before the practice season opened, following the unexpected
resignation of her predecessor. As unusual as it was to choose someone from
outside the program to take control of the team without much time to prepare,
Dixon’s hiring was notable for much more than its last-minute start. She was
only twenty-seven years old, with no previous experience as a head basketball
coach. Neither did she have any military experience. She would also become the
only female head coach at West Point in any sport, male or female. Choosing
Maggie Dixon was a tremendous leap of faith for Army basketball.
The basketball season from the fall of 2005 through the spring of 2006
2
became a “year of magical thinking” for the Army Black Nights. After a slow
start, Army reversed course and finished first in the regular-season Patriot
League standings. It then won the post-season Patriot League tournament to
earn its first bid to the “Big Dance,” the National Collegiate Athletic
Association’s (NCAA) national championship tournament. At the end of the
Patriot League tournament final against Holy Cross, hundreds of cadets rushed
the court to celebrate Army’s victory. The memorable scene of Dixon being
paraded through the crowd on the shoulders of male West Pointers was
3
featured prominently on television sports shows. The following day her
appearance at West Point’s mess hall was met with a standing ovation from the
entire cadet brigade. Although Army lost its opening game in the NCAA
tournament to national power Tennessee to close its season, Dixon had willed
success from her future military officers far beyond what the Academy could
possibly have foreseen. The rookie coach was named the Patriot League’s Coach
of the Year.

* Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law; former Captain, United States Air
Force.
1. For the events underlying the story of Maggie Dixon, see Ira Berkow, West Point Is Standing
at Attention for Army Women’s Coach, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2006, at D5; Frank Litsky, Maggie Dixon, 28,
Who Led Army Women to Tournament, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2006, at C10; Selena Roberts, Dixon’s Civility
Lightened Load at West Point, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2006, § 8, at 1.
2. Roberts, supra note 1, at 1.
3. Video of the last seconds of the Army-Holy Cross game and the post-game celebration on
West Point’s home court, Christl Arena, is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
WpfcCGLYevQ (last visited Mar. 11, 2007).
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Less than a month later, Maggie Dixon collapsed and died at the age of
twenty-eight from an undiagnosed enlarged heart and malfunctioning mitral
valve. She was buried at West Point Cemetery, an extraordinary honor awarded
to a civilian who had never taken up arms herself and was not the wife or child
of someone who had. What was also extraordinary was the way West Point
officials talked about Maggie Dixon as a “leader” upon her death. Army officers
do not lightly refer to people as “leaders.” Teaching leadership is the core
mission of the Academy, and there is no higher compliment than to be
remembered as a leader within an institution of leaders. At West Point,
however, the name “Maggie Dixon” became synonymous with leadership.
In an official Army press release crafted in the stilted “Army-ese” that
characterizes military awards and decorations, Lieutenant General William J.
Lennox, Jr., the Superintendent of West Point, said the following about Dixon’s
contribution to West Point: “She consistently displayed great leadership and
served as an outstanding role model for those both on and off her team. She was
a leader of character with a commitment to excellence who set the example in all
4
she did.” When Lennox later spoke extemporaneously, however, the three-star
general’s admiration for Dixon’s performance as an Army leader came through
much more strongly:
Her presence was what really struck us. That’s the impact a leader can have and,
in a house of leaders, she stood out. She exuberated courage, strength, caring;
she just embodied everything that we learn here at West Point. Her energy just
kind of seeped into everyone else and she just—she’s everything that we talk
5
about here being a leader. She was everything and more.

At Dixon’s memorial service, Lennox offered West Point’s ultimate praise when
he said, “Here, where we develop leaders of character, Maggie was the
6
consummate leader.”
The reason Maggie Dixon’s legacy is relevant to this Article and to this
Symposium issue is because the military almost never speaks of women as
leaders in the way West Point spoke of its civilian basketball coach and the
influence she had in her six short months with Army cadets. The Army seemed
truly stunned to find in its midst a woman who exercised leadership as
effortlessly and effectively as did Maggie Dixon. What added to the surprise,
I’m sure, was finding such a talent for leadership in a young civilian who had

4. Press Release, U.S. Army, Army Women’s Basketball Coach Dies Suddenly, No. 09-06 (Apr.
7, 2006), available at 2006 WLNR 5920372.
5. SportsCenter (ESPN television broadcast on Apr. 10, 2006) (transcript available at 2006
WLNR 6074058).
6. Kevin Kernan, She Will Carry On: Dixon Leaves Legacy of Honor, Leadership at Army, N.Y. POST,
Apr. 9, 2006, at 80. Interviewed at the opening of the next basketball season, one of Dixon’s returning
players, Cadet Margaree King, concurred:
“She embodies what West Point teaches us as leaders,” King says. “She was positive; she
led by example. She was honest, straight up with you at all times. One thing we learn here
is you’re supposed to care about the people you’re leading, and she did. She made
everyone on this team feel special, that they had something to offer. If I can be like her just
a little bit, and bless the world just a little bit like she did, I will have done a great thing.”
Kelly Whiteside, They’re Playing for Maggie: Dixon’s Presence Hovers Over Army Women, USA TODAY,
Oct. 4, 2006, at 3C.
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never before been exposed to the military. Dixon personified martial values of
leadership that the military so often struggles—and so often fails—to foster in
women. West Point’s deep veneration of Dixon also unintentionally revealed
how far the military must be falling short in teaching men to appreciate the
display of military values in women. It was plain to me that Maggie Dixon led
West Point to think of women and leaders in ways that were a bit less mutually
exclusive than they were before she arrived, but her strength in leadership
shouldn’t have been that novel in an institution that prides itself as a house of
leaders.
As a society, both civilian and military, we remain uncomfortable with the
application of professional military values and judgment to the women who
serve in the military profession. Surprisingly, most participants in “women in
the military” debates, regardless of whether they support an enhanced or a
diminished role for women in military service, are complicit in distancing
military women from the military values and judgment that all members of the
military should internalize and rely on for their mutual well-being.
Congress, for example, takes inappropriate advantage of the tremendous
deference given by courts to its constitutional powers to “raise and support
Armies,” to “provide and maintain a Navy,” and to “make Rules for the
7
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” Well aware that
courts are reluctant to question legislation that even purports to rely on military
judgment, Congress has often disregarded the actual values and traditions of the
military profession and substituted its own distinctly non-military, majoritarian
notions concerning the appropriate role of women in military service. On the
other hand, those who oppose limitations on women in military service, or who
seek policy changes designed to prevent the maltreatment of military women,
often reflexively recoil from any mention of military values, assuming that all
martial traditions are inherently unfriendly to women.
The military itself occupies an uneasy place in the middle. It sometimes
realizes that enforcement of traditional military values and reliance on
professional military judgment are the best means of maximizing both the
service of women and mission readiness, but it sometimes succumbs to the
inevitable temptation offered by legal doctrine that can excuse the military from
having to explain or justify its decisions. The military may also bend to pressure
from a Congress seeking convenient military cover for a controversial legislative
policy choice. The only common ground that ever joins all three groups—
Congress, the military, and the military’s critics—is the desire to avoid the
teaching and influence of actual military values in situations in which military
judgment, properly and professionally applied, would lead to inconvenient,
difficult, or uncomfortable conclusions.
The central thesis of this Article is that avoidance of professional military
values consistently tends to disadvantage military women, and that greater
adherence to military values would lead to increased respect for military women
and would also enhance military effectiveness. Two of the most important
contemporary issues concerning women in military service are the assignment
of women to combat duty and the control of sexual assault in a military
7.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–14.
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environment. In both instances, an imperfect process of identifying and
applying military values has distorted federal law and defense policy, imposing
unnecessary burdens on women and unnecessary detriment to military
readiness. In some cases the damage is of constitutional dimension; in others,
the result is just painfully bad and counter-productive policy. It is important to
note, however, that movement toward greater reliance on professional military
values in law and policy favors no single political interest uniformly. Among
Congress, the military, and the military’s critics, all would need to amend the
positions they have taken on some strongly contested issues. The unifying
principle for military law and policy would no longer be liberal versus
conservative, or military versus civilian, or male versus female. Instead,
decisions would be guided much more closely by reliance on traditional
professional values of military leadership and discipline.
Part I of this Article examines the legal context of assignment of women to
military duty in combat. It begins with analysis of a 1981 decision of the United
States Supreme Court that framed military service by women in a way from
8
which they have yet to recover. Rostker v. Goldberg upheld the exclusion of
women from universal military draft registration. More broadly, Rostker firmly
established the Court’s doctrine of judicial deference on military issues—even
under circumstances in which the military disagreed with Congress’s use of
military personnel policy to affirm traditional notions of gender roles. The
decision also gave Congress the discretion to disregard constitutional principles
9
of equal protection on the basis of sex, provided the classification was based on
an understanding of military combat that by definition excluded women.
Twenty-five years later, the military reality is that women serve in both de jure
and de facto combat roles overseas, and yet Congress—and occasionally the
military—continue to cling to the reasoning of Rostker as a justification for
denying women the appropriate recognition and responsibility for the military
duties they perform.
Part II examines recent developments and proposals related to the control
of sexual misconduct against military women. The last fifteen years have been a
never-ending Groundhog Day of repeated studies, repeated proposals, and
repeated promises about the prevention of sexual misconduct that have led to
very little practical improvement. The principal reason for lack of progress is
that both the military and its critics have often doggedly insisted on solving the
problem without reference to professional military values—and at times in ways
that directly undermine those values. A generation of service members has been
taught the counter-productive lesson that military leadership involves two
completely separate and unrelated tasks: first, the maintenance of military
discipline within core military functions; and second, the maintenance of
military discipline related to women. The conventional wisdom (or, more
accurately, lack thereof) within the military is that traditional values of military

8. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
9. “Although it contains no Equal Protection Clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the Federal Government from engaging in
discrimination that is ‘so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.’” Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498, 500 n.3 (1975) (quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)).
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discipline and leadership offer relatively little in solving the tenacious, yet still
fairly pedestrian, problem of training service members to simply respect and
protect one another.
I. ASSIGNMENT OF WOMEN TO COMBAT DUTY
The Supreme Court decision that looms over all questions related to
10
military service by women is Rostker v. Goldberg, which upheld the Military
Selective Service Act’s requirement that men, but not women, register for a
potential military draft. Rostker occupies the legal field of women in military
service for two reasons: (1) it allowed congressional definitions of combat duty,
and congressional limits on who could be assigned to perform it, to stand as per
se exceptions to the demands of equal protection in a military context; and (2) it
established a newly deferential standard of review in constitutional claims
involving the military that, in practice, removes professional military judgment
from the equal protection equation, even though military judgment was
nominally the reason for deference. These two fundamental aspects of the
opinion worked together in a powerfully synergistic way. If principles of equal
protection do not apply in the context of combat duty, and if Congress has the
latitude to both define and assign the functions that qualify as combat duty
without having any corresponding constitutional obligation to explain or justify
its decisions, then by definition Congress has the unreviewable power to control
when, and to what degree, principles of equal protection apply to women in a
military context.
A. Judicial Deference to Military Judgment, Without the Judgment
Rostker is best known for its creation of a broad doctrine of judicial
deference to congressional judgment in matters involving the military:
“[J]udicial deference to such congressional exercise of authority is at its apogee
when legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and support
11
armies and make rules and regulations for their governance is challenged.”
Less well-known is how much the Court’s precedent had to be expanded and
distorted to achieve it. Prior cases that granted a benefit of the doubt to decisions
involving military matters tended to rely on the military’s application of its own
12
professional judgment to specific facts in specific cases. In Orloff v. Willoughby,
for example, the Court deferred to an individualized judgment concerning the
assignment or behavior of a particular service member. The Court was not
13
interested in “running the Army” by deciding whether one particular

10. 453 U.S. 57 (1981). For contemporaneous analyses of the case, see The Supreme Court, 1980
Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 91, 161–71 (1981); Note, Women and the Draft: The Constitutionality of All-Male
Registration, 94 HARV. L. REV. 406 (1980).
11. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 70.
12. 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
13. Id. at 93. “Discrimination is unavoidable in the Army. Some must be assigned to dangerous
missions; others find soft spots. Courts are presumably under as great a duty to entertain the
complaints of any of the thousands of soldiers as we are to entertain those of Orloff.” Id. at 94. Orloff
had fallen into disfavor with the Army because he refused to fill out a loyalty certificate that
required disclosure of any association with subversive organizations. See id. at 89.
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conscripted doctor should have been assigned work as a physician rather than
as a medical laboratory technician. Neither was the Court inclined to involve
14
itself when college students asked the judiciary, in Gilligan v. Morgan, to take
on a continuing supervisory role over the activities of the Ohio National Guard
following the Kent State shootings in 1970. The Court sensibly concluded that
courts were completely unqualified to evaluate the Guard’s “training,
weaponry, and orders,” to establish new standards for its military operations, or
to exercise continuing surveillance of its performance under those standards:
Trained professionals, subject to the day-to-day control of the responsible
civilian authorities, necessarily must make comparative judgments on the merits
as to evolving methods of training, equipping, and controlling military forces
with respect to their duties under the Constitution. It would be inappropriate
for a district judge to undertake this responsibility in the unlikely event that he
possessed requisite technical competence to do so.
....
It would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental
action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political branches
directly responsible—as the Judicial Branch is not—to the electoral process.
Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which
the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional
decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military
force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always to civilian
15
control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.

The Court similarly deferred to the Army’s court-martial determination in Parker
16
v. Levy that a Vietnam-era dermatologist had engaged in conduct “unbecoming
an officer and a gentleman” and conduct “to the prejudice of good order and
discipline” when he refused to conduct training for medics and urged lower17
ranking soldiers to refuse to fight in Vietnam.
Orloff v. Willoughby, Gilligan v. Morgan, and Parker v. Levy all served as
testaments to the value of professional military judgment and expertise, when
applied within the appropriate sphere. In Rostker v. Goldberg, however, the reach
of judicial deference expanded exponentially. The Court adopted an abjectly
deferential stance with respect to a law of general applicability drawn upon one
of the broadest and least factually specific classifications possible—on the basis
of sex—without any serious scrutiny of the reasons offered for that
classification. It deferred even though Congress’s decision to exclude women
from draft registration ran counter to professional military advice—all branches
of the military wanted to register women—and even though the Court’s principal

14. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
15. Id. at 8–10. The Court noted, however, “it should be clear that we neither hold nor imply
that the conduct of the National Guard is always beyond judicial review or that there may not be
accountability in a judicial forum for violations of law or for specific unlawful conduct by military
personnel, whether by way of damages or injunctive relief.” Id. at 11–12 (footnote omitted).
16. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
17. Id. at 736–38.
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justification for deference, oddly, was its professed respect for the kind of
18
“professional military judgments” made in Orloff, Morgan, and Levy.
Judicial deference also obscured the Court’s departure from what should
have been an intermediate standard of review when evaluating facial
19
classifications on the basis of sex under Craig v. Boren. The government should
have had the burden of demonstrating that a legal distinction between men and
women served important governmental objectives and was substantially related
20
to the achievement of those objectives. In the specific context of registration for
a military draft, intermediate scrutiny should have required a showing that
registration of women would substantially interfere with the building of an
effective fighting force. Instead, Rostker turned the tables and asked only if it was
21
possible to build an effective military force without registering women. The
Court applied principles of equal protection in precisely backward fashion.
Normally government must explain why it is important to exclude men or
women; men or women don’t need to explain why it is important to include
22
them. From the military’s point of view, the most productive course would
have been to register the maximum number of potentially qualified persons in
the event volunteers were insufficient.
B. Definitions of Combat Duty as a Limiting Principle for Equal Protection
The second important aspect of Rostker was its use of combat duty as a
conceptual device for managing the place of women in military service. The
Court assumed for purposes of its decision that the exclusion of women from
23
combat duty, as it was broadly defined at the time, was constitutional, and it
18. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 65–66.
19. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
20. See id. at 197.
21. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 80 (relying on Senator Sam Nunn’s statement that “there was no
military necessity cited by any witnesses for the registration of females”).
22. Justice Marshall’s dissent stated the standard for intermediate scrutiny correctly:
Thus, the Government’s task in this case is to demonstrate that excluding women from
registration substantially furthers the goal of preparing for a draft of combat troops. Or to
put it another way, the Government must show that registering women would
substantially impede its efforts to prepare for such a draft.
Id. at 94 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In applying this standard, Marshall believed that the burden of
justifying the classification lay squarely with the government.
[I]t is not appellees’ burden to prove that registration of women substantially furthers the
objectives of the MSSA. Rather, because eligibility for combat is not a requirement for
some of the positions to be filled in the event of a draft, it is incumbent on the Government
to show that excluding women from a draft to fill these positions substantially furthers an
important government interest.
Id. at 104–05 (footnote omitted; alteration added).
23. See id. at 87 (“[T]his case does not involve a challenge to the statutes or policies that prohibit
female members of the Armed Forces from serving in combat.” (alteration added)). Similarly,
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), relied on the statutory prohibition against women serving
on Navy ships in validating a promotion system that gave women a longer period of time in service
before failure of promotion required discharge. “Thus, in competing for promotion, female
lieutenants will not generally have compiled records of seagoing service comparable to those of male
lieutenants.” Id. at 508. In both Rostker and Schlesinger, therefore, the Court justified the sex-based
classification at issue on the basis that another sex-based classification left men and women no
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then accepted without scrutiny Congress’s assertion that a draft would be used
24
only to add service members eligible to perform combat duty. Given these
artificial parameters, the Court’s decision made a certain amount of sense, but it
disregarded the reality—evidenced by the military’s stated desire to use female
non-volunteers (80,000 of them in the first six months of a draft)—that many
25
draftees would serve in positions that did not involve combat duty. At the time
of Rostker, furthermore, it had been less than a decade since the military began
assigning women in substantial numbers to jobs outside traditional medical and
26
administrative fields. Even so, the need for female non-volunteers was
significant.
Rostker rested on a false factual underpinning at the time it was decided.
The only thing that enabled the Court to hold up this house of cards was its
refusal to scrutinize congressional justifications in the same way it would have
had the military not been at issue. Given a civilian context, it wouldn’t have
taken a lot of scrutiny to find the classification constitutionally impermissible.
The government did not attempt to hide the fact that its policy choice was
motivated by a desire to maintain traditional notions of proper roles for women,
and not by a desire to ensure an adequate pool of qualified candidates for
military service:
[W]e start with the proposition that American society today will not consider
drafting women for combat service. Whether this conviction is a moral
judgment or a prejudice, a “felt necessity” or an echo of earlier, chivalric beliefs
about the proper role of women in life, the existence of the belief is a fact
reflected in statutes no group in Congress would now change, and no court
27
would declare unconstitutional.

Citing the Senate’s finding that “[t]he principle that women should not
intentionally and routinely engage in combat is fundamental, and enjoys wide
28
support among our people,” the Court concluded that Congress “was fully
aware . . . of the current thinking as to the place of women in the Armed
29
Services.” If not for the creation of a military safe harbor to the usual standards
longer similarly situated to one another, ironically relieving the government of the obligation to treat
them equally under law. The only decision of the Supreme Court finding military men and women
similarly situated for purposes of equal protection was Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973),
which struck down a rule granting health and housing benefits to all wives of male service members,
but to husbands of female service members only if they could demonstrate actual financial
dependency.
24. “Congress determined that any future draft, which would be facilitated by the registration
scheme, would be characterized by a need for combat troops. . . . The purpose of registration,
therefore, was to prepare for a draft of combat troops.” Rostker, 453 U.S. at 76.
25. See id at 81; id. at 84 (White, J., dissenting).
26. See JEANNE HOLM, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 274 (rev. ed. 1992)
(describing military women’s “metamorphosis from ‘typewriter soldiers’ to mainstream military
personnel” in the 1970s).
27. 126 CONG. REC. 13,882 (1980) (quoting a letter written to Senator Sam Nunn by Joseph W.
Bishop, Robert H. Bork, and Eugene V. Rostow, then Professors of Law at Yale Law School).
28. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 77 (citing S. REP. NO. 96-826, at 157 (1980)).
29. Id. at 71. Another interesting aspect of Rostker is the remarkable spin it placed on precedent
invalidating legal distinctions on the basis of sex if they were the “‘accidental by-product of a
traditional way of thinking about females.’” See id. at 74 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313,
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of equal protection, however, this argument would have left the Court no choice
but to strike down the law as unconstitutional. It is simply not a legitimate
30
function of government to police traditional gender roles.
In the twenty-five years since Rostker, the trend within the all-volunteer
force has been to consistently narrow the definition of duties considered too
31
combat-identified for women to perform. The most significant expansion of
military duties for women took place following the first Gulf War, when it
became impossible to ignore the military’s reliance on women’s service. Federal
laws that specifically prohibited assignment of women to combat ships or
32
aircraft in the Navy and Air Force were repealed. The focus of combat
exclusion shifted to the land-based services, but even there the Department of
Defense opened assignments for women that involved combat risks of hostile
fire or capture provided their primary duties did not require engagement in
“direct” forms of combat. In January 1994, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin issued
the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule:
A. Rule. Service members are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which
they are qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to
units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct
combat on the ground, as defined below:
B. Definition. Direct ground combat is engaging an enemy on the ground with
individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a
high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel.
Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating
33
and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect.

320 (1977)). The exclusion of women from draft registration did not violate equal protection
principles, according to the Court, because Congress acted knowingly and deliberately when it codified
traditional ways of thinking about females. “The issue was considered at great length, and Congress
clearly expressed its purpose and intent.” Rostker, 453 U.S. at 74.
30. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198–99 (1976) (dismissing “archaic and overbroad
generalizations” about the roles of women as illegitimate justifications for classifications drawn on
the basis of sex).
31. See generally Captain Alice W.W. Parham, The Quiet Revolution: Repeal of the Exclusionary
Statutes in Combat Aviation—What We Have Learned From a Decade of Integration, 12 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 377 (2006). Captain Parham is a lawyer and an F-16 fighter pilot with the South
Carolina Air National Guard who has served three combat tours in Iraq.
32. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102–190,
§ 531, 105 Stat. 1290, 1365 (1991) (opening naval aviation to women and repealing 10 U.S.C. § 8549,
which barred Air Force women from assignment to “duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions”);
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–160, § 541, 107 Stat. 1547,
1659 (1993) (repealing 10 U.S.C. § 6015, which barred women from assignment to “duty on vessels
that are engaged in combat missions (other than as aviation officers as part of an air wing or other
air element assigned to such a vessel)” and from assignment to “other than temporary duty on other
vessels of the Navy except hospital ships, transports, and vessels of a similar classification not
expected to be assigned combat missions”).
33. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy,
and Air Force et al., Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule (Jan. 13, 1994)
[hereinafter Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule]; see also GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GENDER ISSUES: INFORMATION TO ASSESS SERVICEMEMBERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF GENDER
INEQUITIES IS INCOMPLETE 18–19 (1998) (summarizing DOD and individual service assignment
policies and practices), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99027.pdf; GEN.
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The new defense policy also permitted, but did not require, the exclusion of
women from additional assignments not covered by the rule under the
following circumstances:
• Where the Service Secretary attests that the costs of appropriate berthing and
privacy arrangements are prohibitive;
• Where units and positions are doctrinally required to physically collocate
and remain with direct ground combat units that are closed to women;
• Where units are engaged in long range reconnaissance operations and
Special Operations Forces missions; and
• Where job related physical requirements would necessarily exclude the vast
34
majority of women service members.

Under the new policy, the military’s conception of combat duty for
purposes of the assignment of women was no longer directly connected to the
physical risk of combat. Women would perform duties that might require them
to “engag[e] the enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons,
while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical
35
contact with the hostile force’s personnel” —the core activity of direct ground
combat—provided they were not assigned to smaller units whose primary
mission was to do so.
The new ground-combat definition seemed to mark the final erosion of
Rostker’s factual foundation. In exempting women from the obligation to register
for a potential military draft, the Court had relied heavily on the statutory
prohibition against women’s service aboard combat aircraft and combat ships
and on the defense policy that barred women from combat support functions on
36
the ground involving risk of exposure to combat danger. By 1994, however,
every significant limitation on the service of women had either been repealed or
significantly narrowed. It was therefore difficult to contend that women and
men were not similarly situated with respect to military service when the
remaining core of combat duties closed to women constituted only a small
37
minority of the military’s forces overall. Congress, however, was not deterred.
In response to the forthcoming Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment
Rule, Congress enacted a requirement, as part of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, that the military must report to Congress
ninety days in advance of implementing any proposal to further amend the
ground-combat exclusion policy. The military was required to provide “a

ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GENDER ISSUES: INFORMATION ON DOD’S ASSIGNMENT POLICY AND DIRECT
GROUND COMBAT DEFINITION (1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99007.pdf.
34. Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, supra note 33.
35. Id.
36. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 76 (1981).
37. See WOMEN’S RESEARCH & EDUC. INST., WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 13 fig.2 (5th ed. 2005)
(indicating that as of 1994, 62% of Marine Corps positions, 70% of Army positions, 91% of Navy
positions, and 99% of Air Force positions were open to women); MARGARET C. HARRELL ET AL.,
RAND CORP., THE STATUS OF GENDER INTEGRATION IN THE MILITARY: ANALYSIS OF SELECTED
OCCUPATIONS 5 (2002) (presenting similar data).
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detailed description of, and justification for, the proposed change to the ground
38
combat exclusion policy.”
There is nothing inappropriate, as a general matter, with a congressional
directive that requires the military to report on its activities. Congress, after all,
is charged with a constitutional responsibility to govern and regulate the
military, and the military operates under a professional ethic of subordination to
civilian control. However, an issue of equal protection emerges when Congress
permits the military to assign its personnel without reporting to Congress in
advance, except when they are female. And this requirement was not even the
most constitutionally suspect of the legislation. In addition to a detailed
description of, and justification for, the proposed change, the law required the
military to affirm, in effect, that any change in policy would leave the
constitutional immunity awarded by Rostker undisturbed: “The Secretary [of
Defense] shall include . . . a detailed analysis of legal implication of the proposed
change with respect to the constitutionality of the application of the Military
39
Selective Service Act to males only.” It is unclear why Congress believed it was
useful or appropriate to ask the military to comment on whether it thought
Rostker was still good law, but it seems likely the requirement was intended to
send a message of congressional determination to preserve traditional gender
roles in the context of military service, notwithstanding intervening changes in
40
the reality of women’s service.
C. Conflicts Between Legal Pretense and Military Reality
The 1994 Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule set in motion
an evolution of increasing assignments of women to combat and combatsupport functions throughout the military services. After September 11, 2001,
military experts predicted that men and women would fight the next war in
seamlessly-integrated ground units in combat-support functions such as
41
military police, intelligence, chemical warfare, and engineering. It would take
another war, however, before the reality of women in combat roles resurrected
the usual dissonance concerning the place of women in military service. In the
second Iraq War, it became evident that the assumptions underlying rules for
assigning women to combat duties were no longer accurate and that women

38. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 542(b)(3)(A),
107 Stat. 1547, 1659–60 (1993) (repealed and replaced by a similar provision in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–163, § 541, 119 Stat. 3136 (2006)) (codified at
10 U.S.C. § 652 (West Supp. 2006)).
39. Pub. L. No. 103–160, § 542(b)(3)(B) (alteration added).
40. A report by the House Committee on Armed Services explained that
the committee does not intend that these affirmative legislative actions on the assignment
of women to combat positions be construed as tacit committee concurrence in an
expansion of the assignment of women to units or positions whose mission requires
routine engagement in direct combat on the ground, or be seen as a suggestion that
selective service registration or conscription include women.
H.R. REP. NO. 103–200, at 283 (1993).
41. See Phillip Carter, War Dames, WASH. MONTHLY, Dec. 2002, at 32.
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were in fact serving in combat roles, regardless of the government’s insistence
that they were not. The core definition of direct ground combat was itself in
43
question because the battlefield had ceased to be linear. There was no longer a
place that was predictably “well forward on the battlefield,” a central
44
component of the Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule.
Furthermore, combat duty was no longer reserved for the traditional combat
arms; in Iraq, for example, military police units (assignments open to women)
were used interchangeably with infantry units (assignments closed to women).
The Army relied on smaller, more mobile organizational units, a trend that
played havoc with the rule prohibiting the assignment of women to combat
45
support and combat service support units that co-locate with combat units.
The military tended to veer back and forth, sometimes acknowledging the
reality that women served in combat roles and sometimes denying, stubbornly
and clumsily, that they did. In February 2005, the Army announced a new
combat honor, the Close Combat Badge (CCB), which was designed to recognize
valor on a new battlefield that respected neither identifiable front lines nor
zones of the safety in the rear. The original guidelines for award of the badge
stated: “The CCB will be presented only to eligible Soldiers who are personally
present and under fire while engaged in active ground combat, to close with and

42. See Lizette Alvarez, Jane, We Hardly Knew Ye Died, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006, § 4, at 1 (noting
the wide integration of women in combat tasks and characterizing the Direct Ground Combat
Definition and Assignment Rule’s recommendation against co-location of female soldiers with small
combat units as “fuzzy” in application); Maura J. Casey, Then and Now, Female Soldiers Just Do Their
Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2006, at A14 (noting that 68 women had been killed in action and 436
wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan; “reality has overrun critics’ arguments”); Romesh Ratnesar &
Michael Weisskopf, Person of the Year; Portrait of a Platoon: How a Dozen Soldiers—Overworked, Under
Fire, Nervous, Proud—Chase Insurgents and Try to Stay Alive in One of Baghdad’s Nastiest Districts, TIME,
Dec. 29, 2003, at 58 (reporting on a field artillery survey platoon assigned to infantry duties; a
woman, Specialist Billie Grimes, served as its combat medic); Eric Schmitt, Female M.P. Wins Silver
Star for Bravery in Iraq Firefight, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2005, at A16 (describing military police Sergeant
Leigh Ann Hester’s bravery under fire that repelled an insurgent ambush; Hester received a Silver
Star, the Army’s third-highest award for bravery); Kirk Semple, A Captain’s Journey From Hope to Just
Getting Her Unit Home, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2006, § 1, at 1 (chronicling the experiences of Captain
Stephanie A. Bagley, West Point graduate and company commander of a military police unit
conducting foot patrols in Baghdad and training Iraqi police forces); Ann Scott Tyson, Female Pilots
Get Their Shot in the Iraqi Skies, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2006, at A1 (discussing female aviators serving
in direct combat roles) [hereinafter Tyson, Female Pilots]; Ann Scott Tyson, For Female GIs, Combat Is a
Fact, WASH. POST, May 13, 2005, at A1 (reporting male and female soldiers’ “frustration over
restrictions on women mandated in Washington that they said make no sense in the war they are
fighting”); Josh White, Military Honors for a Changing Front, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2006, at A19
(discussing the Marine Corps’ Combat Action Ribbon and the Army’s Combat Action Badge, combat
honors awarded to both men and women “who are exposed to enemy action but are not officially in
combat roles”). The most comprehensive and up-to-date account of women’s combat service in Iraq
can be found in ERIN SOLARO, WOMEN IN THE LINE OF FIRE: WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
WOMEN IN THE MILITARY (2006).
43. See Phillip Carter, How the Front Lines Came to the Rear, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2004, § 4, at 13.
44. See Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, supra note 33.
45. A report by the House Committee on Armed Services noted that “[t]he committee recently
began to examine how the Army was applying this so-called collocation policy with units deployed
in Iraq and Afghanistan and with units being reorganized as a result of modularization.” H.R. REP.
NO. 109–89, at 321 (2005).
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46

destroy the enemy with direct fires.” Nothing about the guidelines suggested
any intent to make distinctions on the basis of sex, except for the definition of an
“eligible Soldier,” which was designed to track the Department of Defense’s
definition of assignments from which women must be barred:
The Army will award the CCB to Armor, Cavalry, Combat Engineer, and Field
Artillery Soldiers in Military Occupational Specialties or corresponding officer
branch/specialties recognized as having a high probability to routinely engage
in direct combat, and they must be assigned or attached to an Army unit of
brigade or below that is purposefully organized to routinely conduct close
combat operations and engage in direct combat in accordance with existing
47
rules and policy.

In short, no women were allowed to receive the honor, regardless of the degree
to which they were “personally present and under fire while engaged in active
ground combat.” Interestingly, the definition also rendered men automatically
ineligible if they served under fire while assigned to units open to women. It
was apparently so important to deny the honor to any woman that it was worth
denying it to a much larger number of men as well.
At a military town hall meeting in Afghanistan, a female enlisted soldier
asked Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld why the qualifications for the CCB
excluded soldiers on the basis of their occupational specialty alone, and not on
the basis of their individual combat performance. She asked, “I’m wondering
why our MPs [military police] aren’t considered for the close-combat patch
48
[badge]?” For her efforts to speak up under what must have been intimidating
circumstances, the soldier earned little more than laughter. Secretary Rumsfeld
first passed the question to the three-star general in attendance who, when
pressed to explain the reasoning behind the eligibility standard, said, “You guys
have got to realize that I get to do this with the Secretary every two weeks and
we get lots of tough questions like that.” The transcript recorded laughter in
response to the general’s evasive answer. Rumsfeld took advantage of the
diversion and asked for a new question from someone else: “Last question.
49
Make it an easy one. I’ve had a long day.” The soldier never did receive an
answer from either the general or the Secretary, and the transcript exuded
smugness and arrogance in response to her reasonable question. Apparently,
however, the subsequent publicity arising from her question eventually had an
effect. The Army withdrew the CCB proposal and created the similarly named
CAB (the Combat Action Badge), which would be awarded without regard to
occupational specialty—and without regard to sex—to soldiers who were
50
“personally present and actively engaging or being engaged by the enemy.”

46. News Release, U.S. Army Public Affairs, Army Announces Close Combat Badge (Feb. 11,
2005), available at http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_id_key=6853.
47. Id.
48. News Transcript, U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld Townhall Meeting in
Kandahar, Afghanistan (Apr. 13, 2005) (alterations added), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/2005/tr20050413-secdef2502.html.
49. Id.
50. See U.S. Army Combat Badges, http://www.army.mil/symbols/combatbadges (last visited
Mar. 6, 2007).
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There was no reason this had to be so difficult, unless the Department of
Defense’s motivation was to avoid acknowledging that women serve in combat.
Later in the spring of 2005, a military personnel sub-committee of the House
Armed Services Committee approved an amendment that would have
immediately barred women from thousands of positions in Iraq and
51
Afghanistan in which they already served. The amendment would have
codified a broader definition of combat duties to which women could not be
assigned, despite the military’s objection that combat support and combat
service support units already employed both men and women routinely:
Prohibition. Female members of the Army may not be assigned to duty in
positions in forward support companies.
Forward Support Companies. In this section, the term ‘forward support
company’ includes any unit of the Army of company size (regardless of name)
that:
(1) provides combat support or combat service support to a direct ground
combat battalion; and
(2) in providing such support . . .
(A) maneuvers with, is attached to, or has a support mission to one or
more direct ground combat companies of such direct ground combat
battalion; or
(B) performs any combat support or service support function or
mission within the operational area of such direct ground combat
52
battalion.
53

The amendment was eventually withdrawn, but Congress enacted in its
place another plea to preserve the legal immunity provided by Rostker, a
military mission that never seems to end. Congress again directed the military,
just as it had twelve years earlier, to give notice in advance of any proposal to
amend the combat exclusion policy. Once again, Congress also directed the
military to provide “a detailed analysis of legal implication of the proposed
change with respect to the constitutionality of the application of the Military
54
Selective Service Act to males only.” It seems very unlikely that Congress was
asking for the military’s helpful warning in order to avoid an unintentional
violation of equal protection principles—a “heads up,” so to speak—in the event
widespread utilization of women in military service had created a constitutional
51. See Ann Scott Tyson, Panel Votes to Ban Women From Combat, WASH. POST, May 12, 2005, at
A8.
52. Amendment to H.R. 1815, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 109th
Cong. (May 18, 2005); see also Ann Scott Tyson, Panel Votes to Ban Women From Combat, WASH. POST,
May 12, 2005, at A8.
53. See Thom Shanker, House Bill Would Preserve, and Limit, the Role of Women in Combat Zones,
N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2005, at A20; Thom Shanker, Military Bill Backtracks on Women, N.Y. TIMES, May
26, 2005, at A24; Ann Scott Tyson, Bid to Limit Women in Combat Withdrawn, WASH. POST, May 26,
2005, at A1.
54. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–163, § 541, 119
Stat. 3136 (2006). Those with an appreciation for irony will note that Section 543 of the same Act
increased the maximum military enlistment age to 42.
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imperative to amend the draft-registration law. The provision was more likely
designed to make sure the military understood that the most important objective
at hand was not the mission in Iraq, but was instead the continued vitality of
Rostker and the illusion about women in military service that it preserves.
Classifications drawn on the basis of sex in a military context probably
most often cause dignitary harms, as in the case of the short-lived Close Combat
Badge or in the military’s once stubborn insistence that female military
professionals wear a full-length gown—an abaya—and obsequiously defer to
55
their male colleagues when traveling off-base in Saudi Arabia. The
consequences can also be more serious, as when women are denied the
opportunity for valuable training offered to men performing the same duties—
56
just because they are women. Sometimes, however, military policy choices
made for the purpose of preserving traditional roles can be recklessly lethal. On
June 23, 2005, an attack on a convoy in Falluja, Iraq killed and injured more
women than in any other single incident in the war. The women were forced to
convoy long distances each day because, unlike men, they were not permitted to
live near where they performed their duties of searching Iraqi women:
If anything, the women needed more protection because of their work in Falluja
and the tension it was igniting, some marines said. They had been searching
Iraqi women for weapons and other contraband and felt certain the task was
infuriating insurgents. Even so, the military had the women follow a predictable

55. See Amended Complaint for Deprivation of Constitutional and Statutory Rights ¶¶ 13–20,
McSally v. Rumsfeld, No. CV-02481 (D.D.C. May 3, 2002), available at http://www.neubergerlaw.
com/McSally%20Amended%20Complaint.PDF, dismissed with prejudice per stipulation of the parties,
No. CV-02481 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2004) (unpublished disposition), cited in Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at 16, McSally v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-40 (U.S. July 1, 2005) (presenting the procedural question of an
award of attorneys’ fees; conceding that the underlying substantive question was mooted by the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107–314, § 563, 116 Stat. 2458
(2002)), available at 2005 WL 1596607; see also Ann Gerhart, The Air Force Flier in the Ointment: Martha
McSally’s Garb in Saudi Arabia Chafed, So She Pressed a Lawsuit, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2002, at C1.
After challenging the policy from within the military for six years, McSally filed her original
Complaint on December 3, 2001. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McSally v. Rumsfeld, supra, at 8–
13. Less than a year later, Congress prohibited the military from requiring military women to wear
abayas. See Pub. L. No. 107–314, § 563, quoted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McSally v. Rumsfeld,
supra, at 2–3. Apparently, even for Congress (which has used and continues to use military policy to
preserve traditional gender roles), requiring military women to wear abayas was a level of personal
degradation that went too far.
56. In 2005, the Army opened Ranger training to men serving in non-combat roles, recognizing
that the Iraq War had made formal distinctions between combat and non-combat arms less
important:
The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) created many new challenges for our Army.
Traditional branch roles on the battlefield are no longer the norm for our forces and the
threat facing us today requires that we ensure additional select leaders of CS [combat
support] and CSS [combat service support] units receive the unique skills taught at Ranger
School.
MILPER Message No. 05-067, Expansion of Ranger School Attendance to Combat Support (CS) and
Combat Service Support (CSS) Branches (Mar. 9, 2005) (alterations added), available at http://www.
military.com/MilitaryCareers/Content/0,14556,MPDC_CareerNews_Army_Enlisted_030905,00.htm
l. The mission-oriented sentiment applies unless, of course, they are women: “Attendance at Ranger
school will remain limited to Soldiers for whom the combat exclusion policy does not apply.” Id.
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routine: traveling to and from their camp each day at roughly the same time and
on the same route through the city.
Some marines questioned whether they should have been traveling at all. Male
marines also worked at the checkpoints, but did not have to face the dangers of
the daily commute. They slept at a Marine outpost in downtown Falluja, but
57
Marine Corps rules barred the women from sharing that space with the men.

It seems incredible that we would impose risk of injury or death on military
women to satisfy ourselves that we are preserving their proper role in society.
Nevertheless, the attractiveness of Rostker v. Goldberg is undeniable. It allows
Congress to restrictively meter the benefits of equal protection for women under
circumstances in which the Constitution might otherwise prove inconvenient,
and it preserves the military as an arena in which notions of traditional gender
roles still carry constitutional weight. Rostker is clearly not, however, a decision
that protects and affirms the value of military judgment and leadership. The
decision actually removes military judgment and leadership from the
constitutional equation, and the Court’s deferential stance relieves Congress and
the military of any constitutional obligation to apply the military’s professional
judgment and experience to a determination of how women could most
productively be used in military service.
Almost thirty years ago, a pre-Rostker decision of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia demonstrated an intuitive understanding of
how equal protection for military women would be analyzed in a constitutional
scheme that actually recognized the importance of military values:
But a career in the Navy is not measured entirely in terms of the employment
opportunities and veterans’ privileges that accompany military service. There is
in addition to the practical benefits that inure upon serving in the Navy a moral
element that forms an integral part of the overall experience. This springs from
the idea of individuals taking part in an essential national enterprise to the
limits of their abilities. This aspect of a naval career is not something plainly
reserved for one gender rather than the other. But because of section 6015
[barring women from service aboard ships], sex is required to take precedence
58
over individual ability where the essential part of naval service is concerned.

The essential wrong of Rostker is in its disregard for the expertise, values,
and ethics of the military as a profession. As women began to progress toward
becoming a more integral part of “an essential national enterprise” early in the
all-volunteer era, Congress acted to conserve traditional notions of women,
national obligation, and military service by excluding women from registration
for a military draft. When their exclusion was challenged as a violation of equal
protection, the Court offered much more than temporary validation of
congressional choice given the limited nature of women’s military service at the
57. Michael Moss, A Mission That Ended in Inferno for 3 Women, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2005, at A1.
58. Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291, 295 (D.D.C. 1978) (granting class certification to all Navy
women affected by the statutory bar on sea service for purposes of bringing equal protection
challenge) (alteration added). Like in Rostker, the statutory limitation on women’s sea service in
Owens was added over the military’s objection, and the provision’s legislative history suggested “a
statutory purpose more related to the traditional way of thinking about women than to the demands
of military preparedness.” Owens, 455 F. Supp. at 305–06.
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time. The Court offered an indefinite immunity from the effect of changing
factual circumstances and from the constitutional burden to explain and justify
why it was important to shield women from the possibility of involuntary
military service. Even as a mainstream role for women in military service and a
fundamental change in the nature of modern warfare rendered traditional
conceptions of combat service obsolete, Congress continued to insist upon the
continuing vitality of Rostker despite its disconnect from professional military
judgment.
Judicial deference in matters concerning the military has its basis in judicial
respect for professional military judgment, whether exercised by the military
itself or relied upon by Congress in governing and regulating the military. The
doctrine should have no relevance whatsoever when legislation acts as a bar to
the exercise of military judgment, as it does with respect to contemporary issues
59
of women in combat service. Applying standard constitutional scrutiny to sexbased classifications in a military context does not inappropriately involve
courts in military judgment; on the contrary, it simply removes an overbroad
and unconstitutional legal bar to the military’s ability to make those professional
judgments.
II. SEXUAL ASSAULT IN A MILITARY ENVIRONMENT
The desire of Congress to remove traditional military values and
professional military judgment from equal protection controversies involving
women has had a tremendously corrosive effect on the military as a whole and
on military women in particular. With respect to efforts to control sexual assault
within the military, critics of military policy have also been complicit in
ensuring that military values and judgment are not a part of proposed solutions.
There is a strange parallel between congressional efforts to limit the influence of
military professionalism in matters of equal protection and the efforts of policy
critics to limit the influence of military professionalism in matters of sexual
misconduct. Both see an advantage in limiting the military’s role in addressing
the issue: in the case of Congress, because military professionalism would draw
attention to mission requirements instead of the maintenance of traditional
gender roles; in the case of critics of military policy, because they tend to view
military professionalism as the root of the problem, not the solution to the
problem. Both are wrong.
The single greatest impediment to solving issues of sexual misconduct
within the military is the assumption that issues related to women in military
service involve different principles of leadership and different means of
managing good order and discipline than other issues that affect all members of
the military. This is the lesson, unfortunately, that a generation of military
leaders has been consistently taught. Since the infamous “Tailhook” scandal of
60
1991, we have lived through an endless cycle of repeated studies of sexual
assault committed by and against members of the military, yet we have failed to
59. See Owens, 455 F. Supp. at 309 (finding that Congress, in enacting a flat ban against women
serving on ships, had acted arbitrarily “by foreclosing the Navy’s discretion regarding women well
beyond the legitimate demands of military preparedness and efficiency”).
60. See generally JEAN ZIMMERMAN, TAILSPIN: WOMEN AT WAR IN THE WAKE OF TAILHOOK (1995).
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understand that, at its core, the problem of sexual misconduct in the military
arises from a failure of leadership as a professional military ethic.
A. The Professional Values of Military Judgment and Leadership
The Army’s keystone Field Manual on leadership, Army Leadership:
Competent, Confident, and Agile, describes the ideal Army leader as a person who
has “strong intellect, physical presence, professional competence, high moral
61
character, and serves as a role model.” The Manual also emphasizes the seven
“Army Values” all soldiers must develop:
Loyalty
Duty
Respect
Selfless Service
Honor
Integrity
62
Personal Courage

These basic values embody the “principles, standards, and qualities considered
63
essential for successful Army leaders” and, not coincidentally, the word
“leadership” serves as an approximate acronym for the seven Army Values. The
Field Manual’s teaching on leadership applies to enlisted members and officers
of all ranks, from the most junior to the most senior, in accordance with the
expectation that all members of the military will exercise some degree of
leadership function within their area of responsibility, whether limited or
expansive.
The responsibility inherent in military command, however, involves a
special form of leadership:
Command is the authority that a commander in the military service lawfully
exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes
the leadership, authority, responsibility, and accountability for effectively using
available resources and planning the employment of, organizing, directing,
coordinating, and controlling military forces to accomplish assigned missions. It
includes responsibility for unit readiness, health, welfare, morale, and discipline
of assigned personnel.
Command is about sacred trust. Nowhere else do superiors have to answer for
how their subordinates live and act beyond duty hours. Society and the Army
look to commanders to ensure that Soldiers and Army civilians receive the
proper training and care, uphold expected values, and accomplish assigned
missions.

61. Headquarters, Dep’t of the Army, Field Manual 6-22, Army Leadership: Competent, Confident,
and Agile, at viii (Oct. 12, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm6-22.pdf.
62. Id. ¶ 4-7, at 4-2–4-3.
63. Id. ¶ 4-5, at 4-2.
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In Army organizations, commanders set the standards and policies for
achieving and rewarding superior performance, as well as for punishing
64
misconduct.

In short, “[c]ommand makes officers responsible and accountable for everything
65
their command does or fails to do.”
The United States Supreme Court recognized the breadth of military
66
command authority and responsibility in Parker v. Levy, an appeal from an
Army doctor’s court-martial conviction for violation of two very generally
67
worded provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). One of
those provisions is called “the General Article,” in recognition of the broad
sweep of a statute prohibiting “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of
68
good order and discipline in the armed forces.” The other Article is hardly
69
more specific, prohibiting “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.”
In the face of a constitutional challenge based on vagueness, however, the Court
pointed to the comprehensive authority of military command and the necessity
that commanders be given sufficient discretion to identify and punish breaches
of good order and discipline within their units. The Court noted “the different
relationship of the Government to members of the military”: “It is not only that
of lawgiver to citizen, but also that of employer to employee. Indeed, unlike the
civilian situation, the Government is often employer, landlord, provisioner, and
70
lawgiver rolled into one.” This comprehensive authority requires a system of
discipline—embodied in the Uniform Code of Military Justice—that targets a
much greater range of misconduct than civilian criminal codes but is also more
flexible in the means provided to maintain discipline and correct or punish
71
misconduct.
The military has no independent prosecutorial authority with a role
parallel to that of a civilian criminal prosecutor. The military’s prosecutorial
authority is vested solely in military commanders as a matter of good order and
discipline and military readiness. The same individual who is responsible for
the mission and the people assigned to perform the mission—a commander at

64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. ¶¶ 2-10–2-12, at 2-3.
Id. ¶ 3-8, at 3-2.
417 U.S. 733 (1974).
10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2000) (codifying the Uniform Code of Military Justice); see also
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, pt. IV, Arts. 77–134, ¶¶ 1–113 (2005) [hereinafter
MCM] (providing commentary and implementation guidance for the punitive Articles of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/
mcm.pdf.
68. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000) (codifying Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 134); see also
MCM, supra note 67, at pt. IV, Art. 134, ¶ 60.a.
69. 10 U.S.C. § 933 (2000) (codifying Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 133); see also
MCM, supra note 67, at pt. IV, Art. 133, ¶ 59.a.
70. Parker, 417 U.S. at 751.
71. See id. at 749–50 (explaining that the UCMJ “regulates aspects of the conduct of members of
the military which in the civilian sphere are left unregulated” but balances that intrusiveness with
flexible levels of correction or punishment “which are below the threshold of what would normally
be considered a criminal sanction”).
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the appropriate level of authority—will also decide the manner in which
misconduct will be disciplined or punished:
The disposition decision is one of the most important and difficult decisions
facing a commander. Many factors must be taken into consideration and
balanced, including, to the extent practicable, the nature of the offenses, any
mitigating or extenuating circumstances, the character and military service of
the accused, any recommendations made by subordinate commanders, the
interest of justice, military exigencies, and the effect of the decision on the
accused and the command. The goal should be a disposition that is warranted,
72
appropriate, and fair.

The commander’s decision is intensely situation-specific and fact-bound, and it
requires in large part the application of military judgment and professional
military values, including “the nature of and circumstances surrounding the
offense and the extent of the harm caused by the offense, including the offense’s
73
effect on morale, health, safety, welfare, and discipline.”
Military leaders understand and expect that they will be held responsible
for misconduct within their units that undermines good order and discipline,
and they have been given a distinctive system of military justice specifically
74
designed to foster a professional ethic of leadership. Justice Blackmun added a
concurrence in Parker v. Levy in order to emphasize that maintenance of good
order and discipline within a military environment requires greater exercise of
judgment and discretion, in a manner not always predictable in advance, in
comparison to the control of criminal behavior in a civilian context:
The subtle airs that govern the command relationship are not always capable of
specification. The general articles are essential not only to punish patently
criminal conduct, but also to foster an orderly and dutiful fighting force. . . .
Moreover the fearful specter of arbitrary enforcement of the articles . . . is
disabled, in my view, by the elaborate system of military justice that Congress
has provided to servicemen, and by the self-evident, and self-selective, factor
that commanders who are arbitrary with their charges will not produce the
efficient and effective military organization this country needs and demands for
75
its defense.

72. R.C.M. 306(b) discussion, in MCM, supra note 67, at pt. II, R.C.M. 306(b) (discussing the
policy underlying the allocation of this authority to the commanding officer). “The Discussion is
intended by the drafters to serve as a treatise . . . and may be used as secondary authority.” Appendix
21: Analysis of Rules for Courts-Martial: Introduction § b.(1), in MCM, supra note 67, at A21-3.
73. R.C.M. 306(b) discussion, in MCM, supra note 67, at pt. II, R.C.M. 306(b).
74. The Preamble to the Manual for Courts-Martial states:
Military law consists of the statutes governing the military establishment and regulations
issued thereunder, the constitutional powers of the President and regulations issued
thereunder, and the inherent authority of military commanders. Military law includes
jurisdiction exercised by courts-martial and the jurisdiction exercised by commanders
with respect to nonjudicial punishment. The purpose of military law is to promote justice,
to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote
efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the
national security of the United States.
MCM, supra note 67, at pt. I, ¶ 3.
75. Parker, 417 U.S. at 763–64 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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A system of military justice that is so fundamentally dependent on the
exercise of discretion and professional judgment inevitably withers when
military leaders conclude, or are told, that their discretion and judgment are no
longer necessary in maintaining good order and discipline. This is what has
happened to military leadership with respect to the control of sexual
misconduct. Military leaders have come to believe that there are two very
different kinds of discipline for which they are responsible. One is the
traditional military discipline that underlies mission readiness and performance,
and to which military leaders apply the ethics and skills of leadership they have
learned as part of their professional development. The other is an artificial
category of military discipline comprised solely of issues involving and affecting
military women. In this latter category, the ethics and skills of military
leadership are viewed as inapplicable or even counterproductive. Where women
are concerned, the military is much less likely to exercise the discretion and
professional judgment praised by Justice Blackmun. Instead, the military often
substitutes blunt instruments for decision-making that actively avoid the
exercise of discretion or the wisdom of military experience.
B. The Absence of Military Judgment and Leadership in Matters Affecting
Women
Instead of applying discretion and professional judgment, the military
tends to address issues of sexual misconduct through policies of Rostker-like
oversimplification. Rostker allowed Congress to rely on maleness as a broad
proxy for utility in a military draft instead of specific qualifications more
narrowly targeted to a governmental purpose of military readiness. In crafting
policies concerning sexual misconduct, the military has similarly relied on broad
generalities about the presumed propensities of men or women instead of
specific and professional military judgments about particular conduct and its
effect on good order and discipline in a military context. As a matter of military
judgment, sexual misconduct should be viewed as but one example of a larger
category of misconduct in which a service member has abused, harmed, or taken
advantage of a colleague, thereby breaching a military value of loyalty and
undermining military discipline. Unlike other typically recurring failures of
discipline in which unit members may abuse one another, however—and which
the military disciplines in accordance with professional values of leadership—
the military often attempts to control misconduct that is sexual in nature with
exaggerated, overbroad remedies that fail to take into account military expertise
or military necessity. The military is much more likely to institute reforms that
erase judgment from the equation entirely than to engage in individualized
judgment concerning whether particular conduct interferes with good order and
discipline or whether particular means of controlling or preventing misconduct
76
are the most effective.

76. Policies related to so-called “women’s” issues tend to fall back on judgment-free means of
dealing with something that is inevitably more complex. For example, the Naval Academy realized
in 2006 that it had a serious problem with alcohol abuse as a risk factor for both perpetrators and
victims of sexual assault. Rather than characterizing responsible drinking as a matter of professional
judgment and professional ethics for soon-to-be officers of the Unites States Navy, the Academy
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One method of addressing sexual misconduct has been to impose hamfisted, judgment-free restrictions on the manner in which men and women
interact with one another, even when the restrictions interfere with the
performance of military duty, undermine unit cohesion, or raise significant
questions concerning qualification for military service. For example, following
multiple instances nationwide of sexual misconduct by military recruiters
involving prospective recruits, the Indiana National Guard recently instituted
the “No One Alone Policy” prohibiting military recruiters from meeting alone
77
with applicants of the opposite sex. The non-commissioned officers who serve
as recruiters are presumably the same non-commissioned officers we rely on to
protect the lives of junior personnel in a combat environment, but nonetheless a
conference committee of Congress believed it was a sensible policy and directed
78
the Department of Defense to consider military-wide implementation. This
method of reducing the potential for sexual misconduct is not limited to young
and impressionable recruits. In Iraq today, female helicopter pilots fly combat
missions in support of ground troops, but they cannot socialize with male
aviators when they are off duty if the meetings take place in quarters assigned to
men. Escorts must also accompany women as they walk through the military
bases in which they live and work:
While aimed at maintaining discipline, the segregation can be isolating, Strye [a
female pilot] said. “If all the guys hang out and play poker in one of the guy’s
rooms, and I’m not allowed in there, I’ll never be part of that group. I’ll always
be on the outside,” which makes it harder to cope with the pressures of
deployments, she said. Implicit in the separation, Strye said, is a mistrust that
grates on her as a professional. “You trust me to make combat decisions to
defeat the enemy,” she said, “but don’t trust what I do when I go into another
79
person’s ‘CHU,’”—a containerized housing unit.

centered its effort around a judgment-free, comic-book-level rule to guide midshipmen in their use
of alcohol. Midshipmen were given a “memory aid” of “0-0-1-3,” which was intended to remind
them that underage midshipmen should have zero drinks; drivers should have zero drinks; and
midshipmen of age could have one drink per hour and three drinks per occasion. See Raymond
McCaffrey, Alcohol Policy, Penalties Tightened, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2006, at B10; Raymond
McCaffrey, Naval Academy’s Leader Outlines His ‘24/7 Concerns,’ WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2006, at A3
(reporting the Superintendent’s “24/7 concerns” as sexual misconduct, drug and alcohol abuse, and
honor violations); Ray Rivera, Reining in Academy Drinking: Shore Patrol Tries to Curb Midshipmen’s
Off-Campus Alcohol Excesses, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2006, at B1 (reporting that alcohol was a factor in
two-thirds of Naval Academy sexual assaults).
77. Martha Mendoza, Associated Press, AP Probe Looks at Recruiters’ Misconduct, WASH. POST
(online ed.), Aug. 19, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/
19/AR2006081900285.html.
78. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-702, at 707 (2006) (“The conferees direct that the review [of recruiter
misconduct] also include an assessment of the ‘No One Alone Policy’ established by the State of
Indiana National Guard to limit unsupervised contact between recruiters and recruit candidates of
the opposite gender to determine if the policy is suitable for Department-wide implementation.”).
79. Tyson, Female Pilots, supra note 42 (alteration added); see also Ann Scott Tyson, Reported Cases
of Sexual Assault in Military Increase, WASH. POST, May 7, 2005, at A3. (“In many U.S. military camps
in Iraq, for example, signs are posted in female showers and other locations requiring U.S.
servicewomen to be in the company of a ‘battle buddy,’ especially at night, for their safety.”)
[hereinafter Tyson, Reported Cases].
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It would not be surprising if the military takes its lead in part from
Congress when it disregards its own professional judgment and expertise in
matters related to women. It is tremendously ironic that Rostker purports to
protect the exercise of military judgment in the same area in which the military
is least likely to apply it—on issues relating to women in military service.
However, the military also takes its lead in part from its critics. Advocates for
military women consistently press for policies and procedures that would
address sexual misconduct by means outside of the traditional responsibilities of
military leadership and without regard to professional military values. This
trend is most applicable today in efforts to preserve privacy and confidentiality
for military victims of sexual assault. The issue was satirized in a two-day
sequence of the Doonesbury comic strip, which should have been a subtle
warning that those advocating for greater privacy and confidentiality were
missing a very important component of the problem. The comic-strip
conversation took place between a female high-school senior, Alex, and the local
Army recruiter, Sergeant Truman:
Alex: Sergeant Truman?
Recruiter: Alex! Great to see you! Finally ready to sign?
Alex: Not yet. I want to talk about sexual assault first.
Recruiter: Sexual assault? No longer a problem! We got it covered! If you get
hassled, you can report it without triggering an investigation. That way you
can take a deep breath before destroying a fellow soldier’s career!
Alex: Excuse me?
Recruiter: Um . . . hold it. There might be new wording on this . . .

In the next day’s strip, their conversation continued:
Alex: So my stepmom says there were 1,700 assaults last year. And it’s way
underreported!
Recruiter: Yes, but we’re addressing the problem . . .
Alex: Wait, why do you keep calling it a problem? Sexual assault is a crime!
Recruiter: Well, of course it is . . . but this year we put in place a new prevention
and response policy. If something inappropriate happens to you, reporting it
now is a snap!
Alex: Reporting rape is a “snap”?
80
Recruiter: One call and you’re in business! God forbid, of course.

The escort policy is reminiscent of the Army’s strained version of the “battle buddy” principle that
was implemented following sexual assaults against military trainees at Aberdeen Proving Ground in
1996, which required women to travel in pairs as protective escorts for one another while carrying
out their daily business among male colleagues. See Associated Press, Rape Charges Prompt Army to
Reinforce Buddy System, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1996, at A9; Peter T. Kilborn, Sex Abuse Cases Sting
Pentagon, But the Problem Has Deep Roots, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1997, at A1. It is inexplicable to me
why, ten years later, there is no significant question raised by a policy that seems to suggest the
military cannot or will not protect its people from abuse by fellow service members.
80. Gary B. Trudeau, Doonesbury, May 25–26, 2005; see also Tyson, Reported Cases, supra note 79
(noting number of reported sexual assaults in 2004).
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C. Privacy, Confidentiality, and Military Values
At the time the Doonesbury comic-strip series appeared, sexual assault
against military women had been a high-profile subject of discussion in the
news and within the military for two years, beginning with exposure of an
ongoing disciplinary disaster involving sexual misconduct at the United States
Air Force Academy. The top four officers at the Academy were relieved of duty
after reports surfaced that male cadets had assaulted dozens of their female
classmates, yet the Academy had failed to investigate their complaints or punish
81
the perpetrators. A panel appointed by the Secretary of Defense to review the
allegations, chaired by former congresswoman Tillie Fowler, concluded that the
Academy had disregarded repeated warnings of significant problems related to
82
sexual misconduct and abuse of authority among cadets. Other reviews,
investigations, and reports followed like dominoes, as the focus on sexual
assault within the military expanded beyond the Air Force Academy to include
83
84
the combat theater of Iraq and the other federal service academies. The
problem, as it so often is where military women are concerned, was a failure of
leadership:
Sadly, this Panel found a chasm in leadership during the most critical time in
the Academy’s history—a chasm which extended far beyond its campus in

81. See Diana Jean Schemo, 4 Top Officers at Air Force Academy Are Replaced in Wake of Rape
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2003, at A10.
82. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE PANEL TO REVIEW SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
ALLEGATIONS AT THE U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY 1 (2003) [hereinafter FOWLER REPORT], available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2003/d20030922usafareport.pdf. The panel was formed at
the direction of Congress to “carry out a study of the policies, management and organizational
practices, and cultural elements of the United States Air Force Academy that were conducive to
allowing sexual misconduct (including sexual assaults and rape) at the United States Air Force
Academy.” Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-11,
§ 502, 117 Stat. 559, 609 (2003). The Inspector General of the Department of Defense also evaluated
the Air Force’s institutional response to reports of sexual assault at the Academy over the previous
decade. See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, EVALUATION OF
SEXUAL ASSAULT, REPRISAL, AND RELATED LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES AT THE UNITED STATES AIR
FORCE ACADEMY (2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2004/d20041207ig
summary.pdf.
83. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, TASK FORCE REPORT ON CARE FOR VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
(2004) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/News/May2004/
d20040513SATFReport.pdf. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered the review following
reports of sexual assaults on military women deployed to Iraq and Kuwait. See id. at v. Secretary
Rumsfeld directed the task force to undertake “a 90-day review of all sexual assault policies and
programs among the Services and DoD and recommend changes necessary to increase prevention,
promote reporting of sexual assaults, enhance the quality and support provided to victims of sexual
assault, especially within combat theaters, and improve accountability for offender actions.” Id. at 1.
84. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT
AND VIOLENCE AT THE MILITARY SERVICE ACADEMIES (2005) [hereinafter SERVICE ACADEMY REPORT],
available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtfs/doc_recd/High_GPO_RRC_tx.pdf. The task force was formed
at the direction of Congress to “recommend[] ways by which the Department of Defense and the
Department of the Army and the Department of the Navy may more effectively address matters
relating to sexual harassment and violence,” including measures to improve victim safety, offender
accountability, prevention, collaboration and cooperation with other military and civilian agencies,
data collection, training, and guidelines. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 526, 117 Stat. 1392, 1466 (2003) (alteration added).
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Colorado Springs. It is the Panel’s belief that this helped create an environment
in which sexual assault became a part of life at the Academy.
The Air Force has known for many years that sexual assault was a serious
85
problem at the Academy.

The 2005 Report of the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment and Violence at
the Military Service Academies found the inevitable connection between sexual
misconduct against military women and widespread ignorance about the central
role they play in military operations. One needs to look no further than
Congress to discover the source of misunderstanding. Although Congress has
grudgingly tolerated the increasing integration of women into combat and
combat-support duties—as a matter of military necessity, it had little choice—it
has also obscured and discounted their contribution in order to maintain a
facade that military service by women does not carry the same constitutional
weight as military service by men. This public misrepresentation of military
service by women, however, undermines the respect they receive and affects the
conditions under which they serve:
The expansion of women’s roles was a carefully crafted strategy based on
operational requirements, not on equal opportunity or political correctness.
Unfortunately, many cadets and midshipmen misunderstand this point. This
lack of understanding can contribute to a culture that diminishes the regard
86
given to women and leads to questioning their presence at the Academies.

It is difficult to understand how reasonably aware, newspaper-reading
cadets or midshipmen could fail to comprehend the contemporary place of
women in military service, particularly given their interest in military and
national-security affairs. The effect of law on perception, however, is a powerful
one. If law teaches that women do not serve in combat and have no obligation as
citizens to defend the nation, then that is the lesson future military leaders will
take away. When one of the first specific ideas floated by the Air Force Academy
to address its catastrophic failure of professional military values and leadership
87
was to segregate and isolate female cadets in dormitory living arrangements —
so they would be better-positioned to deter their own assaults—future military
leaders learned an equally catastrophic lesson that problems related to women
in the military are not real military problems. They are not corrected in the same
way other breaches of military discipline are corrected. Rather than applying
principles of military leadership to discipline those who engage in misconduct
or, if necessary, to distance them from the military enterprise, they learn to
distance those affected by the misconduct from the military enterprise. United

85. FOWLER REPORT, supra note 82, at 1.
86. SERVICE ACADEMY REPORT, supra note 84, at 8.
87. U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY, AGENDA FOR CHANGE (2003), available at http://www.usafa.af.
mil/superintendent/pa/agenda.cfm.
Within a squadron, rooms occupied by female cadets will be clustered in the same vicinity
near the women’s bathrooms. The intent is to preserve basic dignity, deter situations in
which casual contact could lead to inappropriate fraternization or worse, and to aid
mentoring of lower-degree female cadets by senior female cadets.
Id.
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States Representative Heather Wilson (R-N.M.), the first (and still the only)
female military veteran to serve in Congress, had it exactly right when she said:
“This is not about segregating women from men. It’s about segregating rapists
88
from the academy.”
The risk that policymakers take when they attempt to satisfy those who,
understandably, want to make it easier for women to report sexual assault is
that they may unintentionally disregard distinctions between civilian and
military contexts. In crafting policies to support military women as victims of
misconduct, it is essential that they not be undermined as military professionals.
However, the centerpiece of the Department of Defense’s response to the latest
spasm of attention to sexual assault in the military is likely to have that effect. Its
recent studies of sexual assault in the military have all focused on the low rates
of reporting in sexual assault cases, and its principal suggestion for reform has
been to give women an option for confidential reporting outside the military
89
chain of command. Doonesbury’s comic-strip satire drew its laughs by
mocking the military’s new Confidentiality Policy for Victims of Sexual Assault,
90
issued on March 16, 2005. Under the new policy’s option for a confidential,
“restricted” form of reporting, victims could disclose assaults to specified
individuals (a Sexual Assault Response Coordinator or a heath-care provider)
for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment and counseling, but the
information would not be forwarded to military command authorities. Victims
would be free to choose restricted reporting if they did not want a military
commander or military law enforcement to investigate the assault:
This reporting option gives the member access to medical care, counseling and
victim advocacy, without initiating the investigative process.
The DoD is committed to ensuring victims of sexual assaults are protected,
treated with dignity and respect, and provided support, advocacy and care.

88. Diana Jean Schemo, Air Force Secretary Says Academy’s Leaders Could Be Punished in Rape
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2003, at A18.
89. See SERVICE ACADEMY REPORT, supra note 84, at 7 (“One essential action is granting the
option of confidentiality so that victims may seek help immediately without fear that the entire
experience will become a public matter over which they have no control.”); FOWLER REPORT, supra
note 82, at 76 (recognizing that confidential reporting “had the potential of preventing command
and law enforcement authorities from learning of serious criminal misconduct,” but nonetheless
recommending an option for confidential reporting).
90. Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretaries of the
Military Departments et al., Confidentiality Policy for Victims of Sexual Assault, JTF-SAPR-009 (Mar. 16,
2005) [hereinafter Confidentiality Policy], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/
d20050318dsd.pdf. In the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 577, 118 Stat. 1811, 1926 (2004), Congress directed the Department of
Defense to develop “a comprehensive policy” on sexual assault, including procedures for the
confidential reporting of incidents. The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) is
now “the single point of accountability for Department of Defense (DoD) sexual assault policy.”
SAPR Welcome Statement, http://www.sapr.mil (last visited Feb. 11, 2007). Its comprehensive
policy is set out in Department of Defense Directive 6495.01, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response
(SAPR) Program (Oct. 6, 2005), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/
649501_100605/649501p.pdf, and Department of Defense Instruction 6495.02, Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response Program Procedures (June 23, 2006), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/
directives/corres/pdf/649502_062306/649502p.pdf.
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DoD policy also strongly supports effective command awareness and
prevention programs, and law enforcement and criminal justice activities that
will maximize accountability and prosecution of sexual assault perpetrators. To
achieve these dual objectives, DoD policy prefers complete reporting of sexual
assaults to activate both victims’ services and accountability actions. However,
recognizing that a mandate of complete reporting may represent a barrier for
victims to gain access to services when the victim desires no command or law
enforcement involvement, there is a need to provide an option for confidential
reporting.
. . . Commanders have a responsibility to ensure community safety and due
process of law, but they must also recognize the importance of protecting the
91
privacy of victims under their command.

This new policy permitting—almost encouraging—confidential reporting
of sexual assault, which bypasses involvement by military commanders, was a
gift to those looking for an excuse not to exercise military leadership in
addressing the problem of sexual assault. In no other circumstance would
military policy grant discretion to an individual military member to decide, for
the purpose of preserving his or her own privacy, whether a commander had a
need to know of a disciplinary issue within the unit, one so severe that it
constituted the commission of a serious crime. When sexual assault occurs
within a military unit, the perpetrator poses a risk not only to colleagues but
also to military readiness. It is incomprehensible that in any other circumstance
the military would expressly offer service members a choice about whether to
withhold information concerning risk to the unit’s mission or to its members.
This is not to say disclosure is easy. There have been notable instances
during the present war in Iraq in which service members disclosed criminal
activity by their colleagues at great physical risk to themselves. The abuses at
Abu Ghraib came to light because an Army Specialist, a fairly junior service
member, reported the misconduct to military investigators. Still on duty as a
military police officer in Iraq, he slept with a loaded pistol: “They’d be walking
around with their weapons all day long, knowing somebody has turned them in
and trying to find out who. That was one of the most nervous periods of my
92
life.” More recently, a Private First Class came forward to report his suspicions
that other members of his platoon had raped a 14-year-old Iraqi girl and then
killed her and her family. He said, “I feared for my safety. Everyone has a
weapon and grenades.” In testifying at a preliminary hearing before courtmartial, however, he explained that he decided to report because “it had to be
93
done.” The fact that these junior service members were commended so highly
for coming forward (at least in some military quarters) suggests that the military
understands the pressure brought to bear against disclosure, and it may also
reveal the military’s expectation that, in many instances, this pressure will be

91. Confidentiality Policy, supra note 90, at 1–2.
92. See Richard Pyle, Associated Press, GI Who Exposed Abu Ghraib Feared Revenge, S.F. CHRON.
(online ed.), Aug. 10, 2006, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2006/08/10/
national/a104347D91.DTL&hw=abu&sn=001&sc=1000.
93. See Paul Von Zielbauer, Soldier Who Testified on Killings Says He Feared for His Life, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2006, at A10.
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effective in preventing disclosure. Nevertheless, the military would never
consider issuing a policy expressly inviting a service member to withhold
information about criminal activity within the unit at the service member’s
individual discretion.
It makes a very specific statement about the status of women in military
service when they are granted an exemption from the professional expectation
that members of the military may need to risk their personal safety, not to
mention their personal sense of discomfort or invasion of privacy, to protect
other service members or ensure mission readiness. This expectation of
disclosure can undoubtedly impose great hardship on those who serve in the
military. It illustrates, however, how the different values and obligations
operating in a military environment can and should affect policy choices in
matter of sexual assault. A civilian victim is under no obligation to take action
for the benefit of anyone other than herself or himself. A military victim, in
contrast, will often have a professional responsibility to take action in service of
a larger purpose. The new restricted-reporting policy, however, makes
absolutely no reference to the effect that a victim’s decision not to report an
incident will have on military readiness or on the safety and well-being of other
members of a military unit.
Recognition of the professional values and obligations of military victims of
sexual assault does not diminish in any way, of course, the far greater
responsibilities of military leadership. The only productive means of addressing
the issue of sexual misconduct in the military is to hold military commanders
responsible for their failures of leadership. A policy that permits restricted
reporting outside military channels directly undermines this principle.
Restricted reporting excuses failures of military leadership by simply excising
military leadership from the solution, imposing a trifecta of harms on the
military and on military women: (1) in the short term, it denies military
commanders the information necessary to punish and prevent sexual assault; (2)
in the long term, it teaches military leaders that sexual assault is a problem
unrelated to traditional military discipline; and (3) it diminishes and disrespects
military women by assuming that women are less able or less willing than men
to report misconduct that sabotages military readiness. If Congress, the military,
or critics of military policy are dissatisfied with the performance of military
leaders in punishing and preventing sexual assault, they need to hold them
accountable for failures of leadership in the same manner in which they would
hold them accountable in situations not involving violence against women. The
answer is not to drive the responsibility underground and relieve military
commanders of the obligation to protect the people they lead.
Similar concerns arise with respect to evidentiary privileges when applied
in prosecutions of sexual assault. Military Rule of Evidence 513 grants “a
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing a
confidential communication made between the patient and a psychotherapist . . .
if such communication was made for the purpose of facilitating diagnosis or
94
treatment of the patient’s mental or emotional condition.” The patient is the

94. MIL. R. EVID. 513(a), in MCM, supra note 67, at pt. III, M.R.E. 513(a); see generally Major Paul
M. Schimpf, Talk the Talk; Now Walk the Walk: Giving an Absolute Privilege to Communications Between a
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holder of the privilege, but the psychotherapist may also claim the privilege on
95
the patient’s behalf. If the production of confidential psychotherapist-patient
communications is a matter in dispute, the rule also provides for a hearing on
the motion (which may be closed upon good cause shown) and, if necessary to
rule on the motion, in camera review of the records or communications by the
96
military judge.
The reach of the military’s psychotherapist-patient privilege was bitterly
contested in one of the cases arising out of the Air Force Academy’s sexual
assault scandal—in fact, the only case to proceed to court-martial. Joseph
Harding, by then a graduate of the Academy and serving as an Air Force officer,
97
was charged with the rape of Jessica Brakey when both were cadets. The
defendant sought production of counseling records presumably containing
communications between Brakey and a civilian sexual-assault counselor, and
Brakey resisted production of the records for years throughout a heated and
98
convoluted litigation history that saw her counselor threatened with arrest.
Ultimately, the military judge dismissed the charges against Harding because
the counselor, acting on Brakey’s desire to preserve the privilege, refused to turn
99
over the counseling records.
Critics of the military’s record of addressing allegations of sexual assault
100
uniformly pointed to the military justice system as the source of the problem.
Their perception was that the military’s psychotherapist-patient privilege failed
to protect the victim’s privacy and undermined efforts of military women to
obtain counseling on a confidential basis, and they believed the weakness of the
privilege was tied to the military’s hostility to allegations of sexual assault.
Evidentiary privileges in courts-martial, however, like military rules of evidence

Victim and Victim-Advocate in the Military, 185 MIL. L. REV. 149, 170–74 (2005) (discussing the
psychotherapist-patient privilege in courts-martial). The military’s psychotherapist-patient privilege
was enacted in 1999 following Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), which recognized a
psychotherapist-patient privilege as a matter of federal common law. See Appendix 22: Analysis of the
Military Rules of Evidence: Section V—Privileges, Rule 513, in MCM, supra note 67, at A22-44. “The
Analysis sets forth the nonbinding views of the drafters as to the basis for each rule or paragraph, as
well as the intent of the drafters, particularly with respect to the purpose of substantial changes in
present law. The Analysis is intended to be a guide in interpretation.” Appendix 21: Analysis of Rules
for Courts-Martial: Introduction § b.(2), in MCM, supra note 67, at A21-3. Military rules of evidence also
include a rape shield rule that bars evidence of a victim’s prior sexual behavior or sexual
predisposition on the same basis as Federal Rule of Evidence 412. See MIL. R. EVID. 412.
95. MIL. R. EVID. 513(c), in MCM, supra note 67, at pt. III, M.R.E. 513(c).
96. MIL. R. EVID. 513(e), in MCM, supra note 67, at pt. III, M.R.E. 513(e).
97. See Michael Janofsky & Diana Jean Schemo, Women Recount Life as Cadets: Forced Sex, Fear
and Silent Rage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2003, § 1, at 1 (reporting Brakey’s allegations and her subsequent
dismissal from the Academy).
98. See United States v. Harding, 63 M.J. 65 (2006); United States v. Harding, No. 05-5003 (Dep’t
of the Air Force, USAF Trial Judiciary July 14, 2006) (unpublished Memorandum and Ruling on
Motion to Dismiss) (on file with author) [hereinafter Harding Ruling].
99. See Erin Emery, AFA Rape Charge Dismissed; Therapist Kept Records Private; The Accuser’s
Attorney Says the Military’s Decision Will Allow the Springs DA to Look Into the Case, DENVER POST, Oct.
1, 2006, at C1.
100. See, e.g., Diane Carman, Be Glad the Air Force Doesn’t Fly Like It Prosecutes, DENVER POST, June
23, 2005, at B5.
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more generally, are based on the rules that apply in federal civilian courts. In
United States v. Harding, the military judge ordered in camera review of
counseling records in response to the defendant’s motion under the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Whether or not one would agree
with the military judge’s decision that Harding had made a sufficient showing
to warrant production of the records, the request for production was based on
102
the constitutional right to confront witnesses through cross-examination and
not on any unique exception applicable only to courts-martial. The same motion
could and would have been made in a civilian federal court. Similarly, the
military judge’s authority to subpoena the records or issue a warrant for the
arrest of the civilian sexual-assault counselor was no greater than the authority
103
that could have been exercised by a civilian federal judge.
Although the issues that received the greatest attention in news reports
were the military judge’s order to produce confidential counseling records, the
counselor’s refusal to comply with the order under an assertion of privilege, and
the subsequent dismissal of the criminal charges when the records were not
produced, there was absolutely no discussion of whether the victim’s assertion
of privilege should have been permitted to control the prosecution of a rape
charge in the military justice system. There are two ways to view the outcome of
the prosecution in United States v. Harding: either (1) the victim was put to an
unfair choice between waiving a privilege accorded to confidential
psychotherapist-patient communications or seeing the charges against the
defendant dismissed; or (2) the victim was given the sole discretion to choose
whether a breach of discipline—a crime—within a military unit would be
punished, when in any other circumstance a military commander would have
made the decision whether a prosecution should go forward. In the case of
Joseph Harding, a commander made the decision to prosecute a member of the
military for the rape of a colleague, but an evidentiary privilege gave the
colleague the authority to overrule the commander.
The military’s psychotherapist-patient privilege, interestingly, does contain
an exception that is peculiarly military and would be unavailable in a civilian
context. Under Military Rule of Evidence 513, there is no privilege “when
necessary to ensure the safety and security of military personnel, military
dependents, military property, classified information, or the accomplishment of

101.

See MIL. R. EVID. 101(b), in MCM, supra note 67, at pt. III, M.R.E. 101(b):

If not otherwise prescribed in this Manual or these rules, and insofar as practicable and
not inconsistent with or contrary to the code or this Manual, courts-martial shall apply:
(1) First, the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the
United States district courts; and
(2) Second, when not inconsistent with subdivision (b)(1), the rules of evidence at common
law.
102. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (holding that the defendant’s right to crossexamine a witness prevailed over confidentiality of juvenile proceedings). But see Newton v. Kemna,
354 F.3d 776 (8th Cir. 2004) (denying discovery of privileged mental health records for the purpose
of cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause).
103. See R.C.M. 703(e)(2), in MCM, supra note 67, at pt. II, R.C.M. 703(e)(2) (governing the
subpoena of civilian witnesses).
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a military mission.” This exception recognizes that the military justice system
serves broader goals than simply punishing a specific offender. Military
commanders are responsible for the safety of an entire community in a way that
civilian prosecutors are not, and military commanders are responsible for the
accomplishment of an assigned mission in a way that has no counterpart
whatsoever in the civilian world.
In a court-martial involving a military defendant and a civilian victim of
sexual assault, application of the psychotherapist-patient privilege raises no
difficult issues related to professional military values. Based on the defendant’s
evidentiary showing, the Constitution either will or will not require production
of counseling records to enable the defendant to adequately confront the
testimony of the victim, and that decision will be a matter of constitutional law,
not military necessity. When both the victim and the defendant are members of
the military, however, the victim’s assertion of privilege is at least potentially
inconsistent with the victim’s professional obligation to place the military’s
institutional need to discipline misconduct undermining military readiness
above an individual desire not to reveal communications concerning the
criminal act. This is not an easy problem to resolve. If the result is to deny
military women a privilege that protects confidential counseling and facilitates
treatment following sexual assault, it seems unduly harsh. If the result is to take
the judgment and authority to discipline sexual offenders away from military
commanders and transfer that professional discretion to military victims who
would prefer privacy to prosecution, however, it seems unduly
counterproductive to the professional status of military women and to the cause
of preventing and disciplining sexual assault. This is a much greater risk both to
women and to military readiness.
CONCLUSION
When all sides of the debate tend to minimize the importance of military
judgment, expertise, and values in crafting laws and policies that affect women
serving in the military, military women are consistently disadvantaged. Greater
reliance on military values may offer the one neutral principle that could,
perhaps unexpectedly, accord military women the constitutional and
professional standing necessary to ensure that respect for women in military
service matches the responsibility that women have for military service. It is
undoubtedly ironic that almost no one sees an advantage in crediting principles
of military professionalism and the contributions of military expertise and
judgment as appropriately important factors in constitutional analysis or in
legislative or policy decisions regarding the military. Congress works to obscure
military expertise so that it will not disrupt the traditional sense of comfort we
find in the belief that military service by women is not as important to national
security as it actually is. Critics of Congress work to obscure military expertise
and also to relieve military women from their professional values and
obligations, based on their assumption that military values are inherently
inconsistent with military service by women. The military remains caught in the

104.

MIL. R. EVID. 513(d)(6), in MCM, supra note 67, at pt. III, M.R.E. 513(d)(6).
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middle, responsible for accomplishing its mission but also tempted by undue
constitutional exemption and pressured by public criticism. Often the easiest
solution is the one that involves the least professional military judgment. The
most productive solution, however, may be the one that involves the most.

